The Socratic Method, Plato’s Dialectics, Aristotle’s Syllogism
Law of Contradiction And The Excluded Middle
The Socratic method In the philosophical enquiries of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle it appears that the work of each is all concerned with the critical examination of things and their meaning and origin – the basis upon which knowledge is founded or derived. Plato appears to focus on the means by which knowledge is discovered and validated. Socrates emphasis is the critical examination of meaning of values, the method by which they are derived – means; and the ends to which they can be applied. Aristotle, on the other hand, appears to have set out to examine, in particular, the source of all that is knowable – the First Cause, as embodied in the Metaphysics.
Philosophy, as an art, is not readily definable in a precise fashion. It evolves or is derived from an acknowledgment that we live or exist in a world filled with many and, apparently, infinite number of things, physical and non-physical, that do not easily submit to explanation or definition.
Life and the physical world around us, of which we are an integral part of, seem to be in a constant state of flux. This can, and often does, lead to the impression that because of this constant dynamic cycle of change nothing can truly ever be known in its entirety. Thus, to give meaning to that world, a combination of the physical and non-substantial, requires an exhaustive understanding of life and what it means to Be.
The result is that it, in turn, raises major questions about man’s place in the physical and discernible world, along with questions about the meaning of those experiences, the purpose or cause of all life itself.
Such are the elements that underscore the philosophies of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle; all of who reflected on and develop methods by which question such as these can or may be resolved. Consequently, their historical works need to be examined as they present us with alternative views and rationales that lead to the discovery and understanding of such truths.
While similar in approach to the Sophists of his time, Socrates’ arguments appear to have been developed in reaction to what he may have perceived as a failing, weakness or deceptive nature of the Sophistic method of discourse and enquiry by his contemporaries. For Socrates, the core philosophical skill was that of dialogue or dialectic – the art of progressing towards the truth through question-and-answer discussion. His method consists of a number of approaches:
1) The skeptical method. Here Socrates begins with a real or professed ignorance of truth or the subject under discussion.
An irony, perhaps, as this approach often demonstrated that he had a greater understanding of what being discussed or examined. This could be attributed to either his intellectual humility or simply to his open-minded approach to learning, discovering what knowledge is or is not, in opposition or contrast to what is commonly known or held view or opinion.
2) Then, there is the conversational nature of the Socratic dialogues. A method that he utilises as a device and technique to discover and draw into the open what is often competing opinions or general beliefs. In this manner, any truth contained within such diversity of commonly held opinions could be gleamed, winnowed or highlighted so that those present could examine for themselves and form a consensus as to the truth or falsehood surrounding any particular subject.
In this manner, any truth contained within such diversity of commonly held opinions could be gleamed, winnowed or highlighted so that those present could examine for themselves and form a consensus as to the truth or falsehood surrounding any particular subject.
To this end, he employs the question and answer method whereby, through critical examination of any and all proposed subjects, a dialectical approach was engendered.
This is in clear contrast to the Sophistic method that can be termed as being self-serving to its practitioners. Socrates, on the other hand, seeks or attempts to be definitive and final in purpose and form. The Socratic method subjects all notions to severe criticism until a more adequate or desirable result is achieved. Socrates’ assumes ignorance as a vital and indispensable critical first step in his pursuit of knowledge.
4) Another key to the Socratic method is that it is conceptual or definitional (intellectual). It sets as the goal of knowledge the acquisition and examination of concepts such as the ethics, concepts of justice, piety, wisdom, courage and the like. Socrates tacitly assumes that truth is embodied in correct definition. Precise definition of terms he held to be the first step in the problem solving process.
5) The Socratic method is also empirical or inductive in that proposed definitions or meanings are examined and criticized by reference to particular and general instances. He tests definitions by referencing them common experience and general usage; and then contrasts them in a dialectical fashion.
6) The Socratic method is also deductive in that a given definition is tested by drawing out its implications and deducing its consequences. The definitional method of Socrates contribution to the logic of philosophical inquiry appears to have been influenced and inspired by the dialectical method of Plato; and it appears to have exerted considerable influence on the logic Aristotle as well.
In the Gorgias we are treated to one such example when Socrates sets out to understand what is rhetoric, apart from the fact that it’s an art practiced by men such as Gorgias and Callicles. The question is posed by Chaerephon:
“… in what craft is he expert and by what name should we correctly call him?” (Gorgias pg 231, 448 c )
To which Polus responds:
“There are many arts, …. and Gorgias here is of the best and partakes in the noblest of arts.” ( Gorgias pg 231-2, 448 c)
Clearly, Polus’ response to the query begs the question – ‘what art would that be that he partakes of that is the noblest of arts?’ – as Socrates points out when he states:
“It’s plain, Gorgias, that Polus is well equipped to make speeches, but he fails to accomplish what he promised to Chaerephon. ….. It seems that he does not quite answer the question asked” ( Gorgias, pg 232, 448 d)
“…. no one is asking in what kind of art Gorgias is engaged but it actually is and what we should call Gorgias. … or rather, Gorgias, tell us yourself in what art you are an expert and what we should call you.” (Gorgias, pg 232, 449 e)
When it is established by Gorgias that the noble art to which Polus refers is rhetoric and that he is a rhetorician, Socrates poses the next question:
“Are we to say that you can make rhetoricians of also others? …. you claim that you are an expert in the art of rhetoric and that you can make rhetoricians of others. Now, what is the scope of rhetoric? (Gorgias, pg 233 449 d )
He continues the discussion in this fashion; and along the way we are treated to a dialogue that covers a number of areas and topics: such as, what is knowledge, justice, what it means to do good or evil, and so forth. Throughout the dialogue, however, it becomes quite clear – that no clear or definite conclusion will be reached about any of the topics being discussed and examined.
One conclusion, however, it seems, is that if experts in their fields or art, such as Gorgias and Polus, are unable to provide clear and definite answers to questions with respect to beliefs or opinions – which impact the everyday lives of non-experts – then lay people are at a decided disadvantage in their decision making when confronted rhetorical experts. This we learn through Gorgias – the purpose of rhetoric is to persuade, its nature that of persuasion:
“… for there is no subject on which a rhetorician would not speak more persuasively than any other craftsman before a crowd …. “ ( Gorgias pg 240 456 b)
“The rhetorician is competent to speak against anybody on any subject, and to prove himself more convincing before a crowd on practically every topic he wishes – but he should not rob the doctor or any other craftsmen either – of their reputation, merely because he has this power.” ( Gorgias pg 240 457 b) For, if it can be taught, the implication is that there is transference of something, knowledge, from the teacher to the student. That being the case, it then follows that the teacher and practitioner must have a considerable something, knowledge, in order to persuasively argue on any and all subjects; imparting or transferring what they do know to those who did not previously know but had come to learn.
The dialogue raises such questions as – not only who is capable of teaching it, but also how one first becomes knowledgeable in the art itself? How would one go about acquiring such a thing, knowledge, to begin with, on all manner of subjects? A point Socrates addresses through further examination:
“Now do you think that to have learned and to have believed, or knowledge and belief, are one and the same or different. … can there be both false and true knowledge?” (Gorgias pg 238 454 d)
Gorgias considers them different and further agrees that there can be both true and false beliefs. But, on the question as to whether there can be both true and false knowledge he clearly states his disagreement, “by no means” ( Gorgias pg 238 454 d )
“Then it is obvious that knowledge and beliefs are not the same. …. both those who have learned and those who believe have been persuaded?” ( Gorgias pg 238 454 d )
Gorgias’ response to the latter is, ‘that it is so‘ ( Gorgias pg 238 454 e) squarely frames the scope through which Socrates is addressing the question.
Not only is Socrates questioning the nature of rhetoric as an art but also its form; and we learn that it’s a becoming art, an intellectual art, a form of speaking or dialogue, in a persuasive manner. It is an art or form that is in constant transition. And being of a transitory nature, it undergoes changes. It is through changes that things in nature – the intellectual and the physical, are perceived as being either true or false. It’s also a function of the intellect to perceive, to learn, to know – to be knowledgeable. The teacher, in essence, must be a font of knowledge or is learning, a student. The latter, relative to commonly held beliefs or opinions, ignorant, in a general sense.
Clearly, the argument is, knowledge must be derived from something. It cannot, however, be given or taught. It is something that is learnt or acquired; and so being persuasive is not a necessary condition of rhetoric. It is from or through learning that we acquire or come to know of knowledge, which exists outside that of any physical or natural forms. Thus, that which exists prior to the teacher is knowledge; and the one being taught comes to know of that which was previously not known through the use of skillful (intellect) deduction or logic. This process of knowing or learning then is or becomes a part of knowledge.
The teacher either knows everything there is to know or he knows nothing. In which case, he will no longer be knowledgeable or capable of teaching. Not a teacher. Thus, Gorgias as an expert, a teacher knowledgeable in the art of teaching and practicing rhetoric must either agree that he’s a persuasive teacher of rhetoric, as he says his art makes him; or he’s not a teacher when he’s practicing, learning or a student. That is, he’s either very knowledgeable on all and every subject – no need to learn and know more than he already knows; or he’s not; The consequences of the latter being that he must refute Socrates by engaging in rhetoric.
For, if Gorgias does not teach or impart anything to those he wishes to persuade, to turn them from their commonly held opinions, then on what basis is his art of teaching, rhetoric, different from other commonly held beliefs or opinions. Which, they themselves constitute other parts or elements of Forms; and which we intellectually and sensibly know to exist as knowledge. Demonstrative knowledge that is derived from dialectics. That is, it can be demonstrated as an art form, to be either true or false – never both.
This becomes apparent when Socrates asks:
“Shall we lay it down then that there are two forms of persuasion, the one producing belief without knowledge, the other knowledge?” To which Gorgias agrees with in his response, “Certainly”. ( Gorgias pg 238 454 e )
Then, says Socrates, rhetoric apparently is a creator of conviction that is persuasive but not instructive about right or wrong.
Yes, says Gorgias. (Gorgias pg 238 455 e)
Adding further along:
“… the rhetorician too does not instruct courts and other assemblies about right or wrong, but is only able to persuade them, for surely he could not instruct so large a gathering in a short time about matters so important.” ( Gorgias pg 238 455 e)
To which Gorgias responds, “No indeed”. (Gorgias pg 238 455 e)
I believe Gorgias agreed because he did not see being in the position as expert and teacher of rhetoric in terms of morality. Perhaps, he saw it as a necessary means to an end; or perhaps, the converse. Even Socrates appears to have become confused at one point and has to recap; He says:
“Well then, let use see just what exactly we are saying about rhetoric, for I cannot myself yet understand what I mean. (Gorgias pg 238 455 e)
If true, Gorgias’ answers to Socrates imply that persuasion through the art of rhetoric is, in essence, a transference process that takes place during a dialogue or intellectual exchange. The objective of rhetoric being: to persuade, rather than to discover, suggests that another objective of rhetoric is to also teach. This then makes it, at least, twofold in nature; which Gorgias appears not to be aware of. For, what else could persuasion, of any type, be if not an exchange in which the beliefs and opinions expressed must also have an end: to persuade and for what purpose?
Both the teacher and the taught share views and opinions in a dialectical fashion; in which the purpose of the teacher is to teach, and that of the student- to be taught or to learn? Rhetoric then is the form; persuasion/teaching the method or means an end, that which is taught or learned: knowledge. One must then have, beforehand, knowledge to be able to teach or persuade. Opinions or beliefs are primarily the result of being self-taught; and so too, a part of knowledge as well. All of which encompasses knowledge itself. If nothing is shared then nothing, in fact, takes place. Nothing changes. What do we know of rhetoric, as expressed by Gorgias? It is to persuade. Thus, if nothing is learnt through the persuasion, rhetoric teaches nothing and the student, perhaps, acquires nothing as well.
Thus, any form of knowledge that comes about as a result of rhetoric is not a necessary end. The teaching or persuasion, are means or forms. So, rhetoric must be of a deliberative nature. Learning is derived from the teaching and by teaching we learn as well, regardless of the art. The teacher needs to know what the student doesn’t know or needs to know to be able to teach him. That which is or can be learnt becomes so, as do opinions and beliefs; each elements of what constitutes knowledge.
Learning, then, is an intellectual means by which the forms of knowledge, an end, is acquired or discerned in the context of the physical or sensible world of nature. Consequently, Gorgias appears to be himself mistaken when he affirms that the end of rhetoric is persuasion, which necessarily, should be teaching. As an art, it exists outside of the practioner and the teacher – as knowledge. And the acquisition of knowledge, knowing, is the end of learning which rhetoric reinforces through teaching or persuasion.
Rhetoric as an art form is similar to, alike, but not the same, as dialectics; alike in form but not in purpose or end, nor essence. Rhetoric is concerned with the uses to which the art can be applied; while dialectics attempts to understand or unearth the relationships that appear to exist between contrary beliefs and opinions. Dialectics seeks understanding or knowledge; and as a result, then, rhetoric is or becomes little more than a debating skill, an intellectual exercise. Its forms and means of persuasion of use primarily to those, such as orators.
As both a teacher and practitioner of rhetoric, Gorgias appears to have acknowledged and agreed that knowledge is derived from another source, a form other than rhetoric – that of teaching, whose end is that of learning; and consequently, knowledge. Thus, in this capacity, without a third condition: if he practices and teaches so that he can be an expert rhetorician- to what purpose or end? If the rhetorician learns from practicing his art on what does he base his knowledge? A form that cannot be taught but is to be learnt or discovered. It must be practiced for it to become, a necessary part of the art itself; and that which is or can be learnt becomes, as a result of being taught or practiced. In essence, a previous something. If these conditions are met, opinions and beliefs are pieces, parts or elements of knowledge; at some point a prior condition.
In addition, it raises questions as to whether it’s a good or desirable thing to have rhetoricians use their art of persuasion in situations where the outcome, due in part to their persuasive ‘skills, has the potential to unduly influence the decisions or policies of public officials whose mandate is to protect the citizens and the state.
The dialogues of the Gorgias, in particular, is a rather illuminating look at Socrates’ philosophical underpinnings when, viewed in light of his trial and defence in the Apology where Socrates steadfastly refuses to engage in rhetorical arguments as an acceptable defense in the face of his strongly held beliefs and opinions.
This is something we see when Callicles, at one point, chastises Socrates when by saying:
” …. It is a good thing to engage in philosophy just so far as it is an aid to education, … it is no disgrace for a youth to study it, but when a man who is now growing older still studies philosophy the situation becomes ridiculous. .. I feel toward philosophers very much as I do toward those who lisp and play the child. When I see a little child for who it is still proper enough to speak this way … I like it and it seems to me pretty and ingenuous and appropriate to the child’s age; and when I hear it talking with precision it seems to me disagreeable and it vexes my ears …. when one hears a grown man lisping or sees him playing the child, it looks unmanly and worthy of a beating.
I feel exactly the same too about students of philosophy. When I see a youth engaged in it, I admire it and it seems natural and I consider such a man ingenuous, and the man who does not pursue it as illiberal and one who will never aspire to any fine and noble deed. But when I see an older man still studying philosophy and not deserting it, that man, Socrates, is actually asking for a whipping. For … such a man, even if exceptionally gifted, is doomed to prove less than a man, shunning the city …. You neglect, Socrates, what you ought to care for and pervert a naturally noble spirit by putting on a childlike semblance. … “ ( Gorgias pg268 485 -6)
Socrates, it seems, perceives the art or practice of rhetoric as a form of flattery. This is implicit when he asks of Callicles:
“What of the rhetoric addressed to the Athenian people and other free peoples in various cities ….? Do the orators seem to you to always speak with an eye to what’s best, their sole aim to render the citizens as perfect as possible by their speeches, or is their impulse also to gratify the citizens, and do they neglect the common good for their personal interests and treat the people like children, attempting to please them, with no concern whatever whether such conduct makes them better or worse?” ( Gorgias pg 285 502 d )
When contrasted with statements attributed to him in the Apology , a powerful account of the last days of Socrates, a vivid description of the philosophical defense of his life is seen when he presents his position to the Athenian jury. He’s reported to have said:
” You are mistaken…. if you think that a man who is worth anything ought to spend his time weighing up the
prospects of life and death. He has only one thing to consider in performing any action …. whether
he’s acting rightly or wrongly, like a good man or a bad one. …. ” ( Apology, pg 14, b-c )
In the Crito , Socrates, pleaded with by his friends to make his escape from Athen and avoid his death sentence he states:
“….. In light of this agreement we must consider whether or not it’s right for me to try and get away
without an official discharge. If it turns out to be right, we must make the attempt; if not we must let it drop.
As for the considerations you raise about expense and reputation and bringing up my children, I am afraid,
Crito, that they represent the reflections of the ordinary public ….. ” (Crito, pg 33 c-d )
Later on in the discussion Socrates asks:
“Do we say that one must never do willingly do wrong, or does it depend upon circumstances? Is it true … that there is no sense in which wrongdoing is good or honourable? Or have we jettisoned all our former convictions …. the fact remains that to do wrong is in every sense bad and dishonourable for the person who does it. Is that or view or not?” ( Crito, pg 34, 49b)
Perhaps, the most well known and quoted statement summing Socrates’ life and philosophical outlook is:
“I tell you to let no day pass without discussing goodness and all the other subjects about which you hear me talking and examining both myself and others is really the best thing that a man can do; and a life without this sort of examination is not worth living. …” (Apology pg 23 38)
The Platonic method
As a student of Socrates, Plato would have been, undoubtedly, influenced by the Socratic style of thinking and reasoning; and as such, we often see where he tries to guide the progress of learning through the examination of abstract philosophical truths, exercises. But to what end? And with the dialogues of Plato, which he appears to have abandoned at some point, we’re witness as he develops, expresses, and defends his own, more firmly established, conclusions about central philosophical issues; one of which is a critical examination of the theory of Forms, attributed to Parmenides.
He also examines commonly held beliefs and opinions, some of which raise significant and reasonable doubt about whether morally right action can be defined in terms of divine approval; and, in so doing, he demonstrates significant dilemmas which are likely to appear when appeals to authority in defense of moral judgments are made.
For, he states:
” The truth of the matter is this …. where a man has once taken up his stand, either because it seems
best to him or in obedience to his orders, there I believe he’s bound to remain and face the danger, taking
no account of death or anything else before dishonour ” (Apology, pg 15, d-e)
” I have never lived a quiet ordinary life. I did not care for the things that most people care about – ….
I thought that I was too strict in my principles to survive in I went in for this sort of thing. So instead …
I set myself to do you individually in private what I hold to be the greatest possible service. I tried to
persuade each one of you not to think more of practical advantages than of his mental and moral
well-being, or in general to think more of advantage than of well-being in case of the state or of anything else ” (Apology, pg 21, c)
In the Meno Plato addresses the notion that ‘no one knowingly does wrong’ to introduce the doctrine of recollection. In it he, the reader and his contemporaries are led through a series of Socratic discussions in which he attempts to discover whether things such as virtue or an even the art of rhetoric, representative of the more common or sensate human experiences, can be taught. For, if it cannot, the answer brings with it serious consequences; consideration and examination will have to be given to those consequential things. For, whether other things can or cannot be taught or not will requires examination as well.
The question, as simple as it may seem or appear, is at least twofold: if virtue can be taught, then it must, itself, have a purpose or a reason. That reason being easily reverts back to – whether to know infers that Man, intellectually, knows primarily or first about his individual self or being, representative of one, the particular. The physical form of his being which is always perceived as being a part of nature. His nature. His manifestation of Self.
Thus, being a part of nature he, man, can either be eternal or not. He is or he is not.
” … trick argument that a man cannot try to discover either what he knows or what he does not know?
He would not seek what he knows, for since he knows it there, then there is no need of the enquiry; now what
he doesn’t know, for in that case he doesn’t even know what he’s to look for .” (Meno pg, 363 e)
Is it a paradox? The paradox being that knowledge, achieved through the utilisation of his innate intellect is fundamental to man knowing first what man is or is not. That is, with such understanding or knowledge, to understand himself man must first know himself; and which in turn infers that it, knowledge, is something that must be learnt. As does virtue, or justice or honour, into infinity.
Understanding the duality of what it is to be human, physical and natural aspects of reality, the physical world, Nature itself, requires or demands that we know or understand our role or part within the whole itself. Which includes all or the known universe, as apprehended by Man. To what purpose? Man is in his element; and is also a part of the elements. The sum of which is the sensible and the intellectual worlds and knowledge.
The acquisition of such knowledge requires that we grasp at least its nature and function, otherwise it’d seem impossible that we’ll ever be able to learn anything. Acquiring that knowledge results in what Men agree on as being as true or false, what is and what is not. And the end constitutes or amounts to Knowledge. Thus, what is unknown cannot be known, it can only be learnt or become known; and to know, is its own form of knowing. The result, end, being that Forms are eternal, as Man perceives it to be. Knowledge, therefore, resides in a class that consists of many similar forms. The sum of which is Knowledge itself. A philosophical position which, while unequivocal, begs the question: how will or do we know that which we do not, or yet know? We know of ways to go about looking for or finding such forms in nature: we examine that which is perceived in the sensible world by comparison with other forms to define and classify or categorise. Methods that rely on relative attributes to provide identifiable differentiates, as in from the particular to the general; and vice-versa. Questions of origin or source giving birth to such things as genus and categories and underlying sub-strata or classes or groups or elements and so forth.
“Is there a state which you call having ‘learned'”, Gorgias is asked.
For, having learned implies or infers that something has been taught or given by someone who too practices the art of teaching; someone who also learns as a necessary result of being taught or persuaded. And so, knowing of or having knowledge of those things which cannot be undone or negated, even if men wishes it to be otherwise is an impossibility. What is known remains forever known. That which never was can and do come to be known either through teaching or learning. It can be forgotten and still be relearned. The same applies to all arts as well.
I have a bit of quibble about whether he played a bit footloose with the semantics of rhetoric at this juncture.
Having believed, on the other hand, confers different consequences with respect to having learned; the former can be undone, as in disbelieve. Thus it appears that neither is in agreement on either the definition or meaning of to know or knowing. Plato’s here seems to be an attempt to draw a distinct and immutable line about the innate nature of Knowledge, in general; and of knowing in the particular the basis of which would then be an unequivocally statement about the nature of Things and how they come into Being. An indicator of what must exist as a state between such things as teaching, learning, comprehension or understanding; and knowledge itself.
For if Gorgias had answered contrary to the following questions:
” …and such a thing as ‘having believed’? ” He answers in the affirmative. and
“… do you think that have learned and to have believed, or knowledge and belief, are one and the same or different?” ( pg 238 454 c)
Gorgias, states that he considers them different
The inescapable conclusion – since it must first be acknowledged or accepted as being either true or false, possible or impossible, probable or improbable, and so on …. all contrary attributes of some form, ad infinitum. The end result being that anything which regresses towards infinity, in either direction must first have a starting point; and at some point either a stopping or a place where it ceases to be; or it returns upon itself.
So then, at which point do things, both innate and physical, become or comes into being? Does it, if ever, cease to be what it has always been, the proof of which is knowledge and that which is learnt? The same intellectual abilities which allows or provides us with the ability to place a stake at some point and assert that there are things which come into being and ceases to be must also inform us of what those things are in and of themselves. Opinions and beliefs, then, allow or afford us the ability to redraw the line or reposition the points; and in so doing, knowledge is discovered or acquired.
Consequently, since Man, is; he’s intellectually able to reason by induction or deduction whether he knows or do not know anything. For, if he did not exist the question then becomes quite irrelevant. But he is informed by nature, which includes the world around, and in which he exists and of which he’s a part. So, any measure of truth or falsity about the nature or origin of knowledge must first begin with the nature of Man himself.
So rather than stating that which we cannot or do not know about anything we most often learn by first enumerating what we think, belief or even assume that we know about the sensible world forever remains but a comparison or relationship between what our senses tell us and that which our intellect inform us as being true or false. Clearly then, there cannot be such a things as false knowledge; and if all knowledge is true then only opinions and beliefs are capable of being false.
In the examining recollection, Plato expresses his conviction that it’s, not only but, perhaps, primarily through critical examination of what man perceive of the physical world, intellectually, that he is capable of unraveling the layers which comprise what Man knows of both the natural and sensible or physical worlds. There can be no realm that is unnatural to man.
And so learning, teaching, understanding or comprehension are all stages by or through which the immutability of Nature manifests itself: Knowledge. Eternal realities which must exist in a prior or previous state to man perceiving them. Before they come into being. And it’s through the application of intellect that Man conceives of both the mutability of the sensible and the immutability nature, the Soul – which constitutes Knowledge. The way in which it manifests itself is through the Forms which man is able to perceive the senses on which his intellect depends on for change.
In the Phaedo Socrates says Cebes while discussing death and dying,
” …. If there were not a constant correspondence in the process of generation between the two sets of opposites, going around in some sort of circle, if generation were a straight path to the opposite extreme without any return to the starting point or any deflection, do you realise that in the end everything would cease to be?” (Phaedo pg 55-72 b)
And, he continues,
“In just the same way, …. if everything that has some share of life of life were to die, and if after death the dead remained in that form and did not come back to life again, would it not be inevitable that in the end everything should be dead and nothing alive? … what possible means could prevent their number from being exhausted by death? (Phaedo pg 55-72 b)
But,
” … if everything is true, I believe that this is, ….. Coming to life again is a fact; and it’s is a fact that the living come from the dead; and a fact that the soul of the dead exist.” (Phaedo pg 55 e)
To which Cebes interjects,
” …. there is a theory …. that what we call learning is really just recollection. If that is true, then surely what we recollect now we must have learned at some other time before they entered the human shape. So, … it seems likely that the soul is immortal.” (Phaedo pg 55 e)
And thus, Plato intricately constructs and connects recollection with the notion of the Forms, making the argument that knowledge – in all its possible meanings must itself pre-exist in some form or previous state; a state that is, before knowing. One in which the soul – the essence and embodiment of Man is capable of recognising as such. That recognition and comprehension of self cannot be separated, divided or subtracted. Who or what man is can only be known ‘fully’ or understood through the asking of such critical questions as who or what is man? Why is man. Even, when is man? The peeling away of each layer reveals, to the intellect, things as truths, justice, honour, virtue – all of which are capable of being individual and particular; and yet, constituting the whole and recognised as being one. Indivisible: Knowledge, the knowing of the general as well as the particular on all subjects.
Plato says,
“I look at it this way, … We are agreed, …. that if a person is to be reminded of anything, he must first know it at some time or another? (Phaedo pg 56 b)
and
“Are we also agreed in calling it recollection when knowledge comes in a particular way? …. Are we not justified in saying that he was reminded of the object which he thought of? …So, by recollection we mean the sort of experience which …. when it happens with reference to things which we had not seen … or that we had forgotten?” (Phaedo pg 56 e)
Knowledge of what or who, where, why or when, used in conjunction or combined with the Socratic method unearths the diversity with which the form expresses itself. Plato sees and uses recollection as such, a form; and in the process, a consequence, reveals the attributes of which immortality must consist: eternal mutability. Knowledge becomes the process or means whereby the Soul discovers or realises itself.
This is demonstrated as Socrates leads an uneducated boy through the sophisticated geometrical progression of a triangle through careful questioning. Leading to the conclusion that the slave boy somehow already knew the correct answers but was unaware of this ‘knowledge’. Knowledge then, doe not appear to come into being but rather always, is. What changes or is mutable would then be ideas that are expressions of the forms. It is the knowing of, the intellectualising of knowing, which then give rise to knowledge in the general sense.
And again, when Socrates states:
“Then, if we obtained it before our birth, and possessed it when we were born, we had knowledge before and at the moment of birth, not only of equality and relative magnitudes, but of all absolute standard. (Phaedo pg 58 d)
And as such,
“… If it is true that we acquired our knowledge before our birth and lost it at the moment of birth, but afterward, by exercise of our senses upon sensible objects, recover the knowledge …. I suppose what we call learning will be the recovery of our own knowledge, and surely we should be right in call this recollection.
… So, I maintain, there are two alternatives. Either we are all born with knowledge of these standards, and retain it throughout our lives, or else, when we speak of people learning they are simply recollecting what they knew before. In other words, learning is recollection.” (Phaedo pg 59 76 b)
We then see further on that recollection, learning, the soul, re-incarnation and knowledge itself is woven together to produce knowledge and the soul must be:
” … most like that which is divine, immortal, intelligible, indissoluble and ever consistent and invariable whereas the body is like that which is most human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, dissoluble and never self-consistent (Phaedo pg 63 b)
It is also illustrates the effectiveness of the Socratic method and its ability to convey, extol or raise awareness of what Man, individually, implicitly or intuitively knows of himself and the physical or natural world. This too is demonstrated by Socrates, Phaedo (pg 48-9, 65-67) where he discusses the notions of death and dying, in arguments that consider the nature of the soul.
The Socratic dialogue and method of enquiry interweaves itself throughout discussions about such things as the nature of justice, virtue, wisdom, courage and moderation, as they may exist both in individual instances, particular cases and society as a whole, in the general sense. For Plato the Socratic form can be useful for demonstrating that in an ideal society a truly wise man would require detailed accounts of human knowledge gathered and borne by experience and nurtured by specialised education to be achieved; and still would be incapable of knowing everything that there is to know about anything in both particular and general senses.
In my view, the philosophical methodologies of all three philosophers, gives the impression that the Socratic method is somewhat ‘intuitive’ and easy to follow or accept because of its question and answer format. A method by which even lay persons, non-philosophers and philosophers alike can participate and come to discover or understand or know things discernible through intellect and discourse.
A criticism which Socrates seems to make about the notion is that while its strength is in its demonstrative nature,
“.. when one believes that an argument is true without reference to the art of logic, and then a little later decides rightly or wrongly that it is false, and the same thing happens again and again … especially with those who spend their time arguing both sides … they end by believing that they are wiser than anyone else, because they alone have discovered that there is nothing stable or dependable either in facts or in arguments, and that everything fluctuates …..” (Phaedo pg 72 C)
Its strength, however, rests in the ability to take what may seem like a complex issue or question, reduce it to its components parts by stripping away the many layers to expose the core element. The result being, that which remains after such a detailed examination must then be fact or true. Becomes known and in turn is representative of knowledge.
A consequential result, as an example, is that commonly held views, beliefs or opinions when subjected to the Socratic or dialectical method of examination will be shown to be true or false; or simply misunderstood since men sometimes mistakenly judge that which is most of things, attributes or appearances, as being the object itself.
The Aristotelian method:
Aristotle’s method of enquire, while it differs from both Plato and Socrates in style – and perhaps substance, never-the-less, seems to be a form of synthesis of Socrates, Plato ( among others ) and his own, especially so in the Metaphysics. Here we see an attempt to develop a universal method of reasoning by means of which it becomes possible to learn everything there is to know about nature and reality. The sensible and the intellectual. The Fundamental nature, aspect or feature of reality – Being and its relationship with all else.
In Aristotle we see a method of reasoning where the dialectical nature of contraries play a pivotal role in establishing not only what the Forms are but also how they come about to be, or being. It fixes the focus on how particular or general truths or falsehoods are established.
To begin he says,
“We must first state the subject of our enquiry and the faculty to which it belongs: its subject is demonstration and the faculty that carries it out demonstrative science. We must next define a premise, a term and a syllogism, and the nature of a perfect and an imperfect syllogism. And after that, the inclusion or non-inclusion of one term in another as in a whole, and what we mean by predicating one term of all, or none of another.” (An. Priora pg 65 10-14)
The forms in which knowledge is revealed, however, comes about in certain fashion; and is perceived by the senses. Forms, however, are only expressions or manifestations of something else: Ideas. They are discovered or revealed through the dialectics of demonstration and dialogue where opinions, beliefs or views are shared or exchanged; and through further examination particular things are compared with more general ones and identifing which particular ideas appear to be generally true or false. Or mis-directed.
This then is where inductive and deductive reasoning is to further examined. The constraints which are placed on the scope of the enquiry is set out when he states,
“A premise, then, is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another. This is either universal or particular or indifinite. By universal … that something belongs to all or none of something else; by particular that it belongs to some, or not to some or not to all; by indefinite that it does or does not belong, without any mark to show that it is universal or particular.” (An. Priora pg 65 15-20)
In another sense, it can be said that through dialogue, particular opinions or beliefs are subjected to critical examination in relation to more general truths; and falsehoods are generally discarded. Or become another group of opinions or beliefs which requires further and more detailed scrutiny. The end result in any case would, undoubtedly, be more or further general knowledge. As such, the establishment of such a process, in time becomes a means by which particular knowledge, in all senses, can be measured and compared against the idea of knowldge itself. For example, to know what is a man we must also know what is Man as well. Contrary or similar things, therefore, depend on the relationships of things to one another. As hot is to cold. Tall is to short. Fish is to water.
What is a crucial difference between dialectics and syllogistic methods is the role of the premise which, in effect, sets the rules by which intellectual truths, or knowledge is to be established: the propositions are made, the premises are identified and their relationships revealed through demonstrations which then strips away the attributes of each until one primary attribute remains. This then becomes particular causes which can be further examined in search of any further causes.
“The demonstrative premise differs from the dialectical, because the demonstrative premise is an assertion of one of two contradictory statements ( The demonstartor does not ask for his premis but lays it down ); Whereas, the dialectical premise depends on the adversary’s choice between two contradictories. …. both the demonstrator and the dialectician argue syllogistically after stating that something does or does not belong to something else.” (An. Priora pg 65 25-28)
In Metaphysics Aristotle lays the foundation by which nature, the physical manifestation of all that, Is, is to be perceived and understood. A method, which it would appear, requires deep or an abstract understanding of nature or the natural world. For Aristotle the key to knowledge appears being able to define what it is in a very fundamental manner: is it finite or infinite. If it is finite, all can be known in time; if infinite, can never be fully or completely known. And as such, his position addresses issues earlier philosophers had created or raised and whose explanations were to often unsatisfactory. Some, such as Anaxagoras who emphasized material causes. Or Plato whose notion of the Forms is given critical scrutiny by Aristotle.
What is ‘known’ or accepted as a dialectical premise is also an assertion that something is or is not; and so,
“A syllogistic premise, without qualification, will be an affirmation or denial of something concerning something else in the way … described; it will be demonstrative if it is true and obtained by the first principles of its science. … a dialectical premis is the giving of a choice between two contracdictories …. when he’s proceeding by question; when he’s syllogising it is an assertion of that which is apparent and generally admitted.” (An. Priora pg 65 30-34)
Aristotle further clarifies his position by stating that the term by which a premise is said to be resolved is that of ‘being’:
“A term into which the premise is resolved, that is, both the predicate and that of which it is predicated” (An. Priora pg 66 17-19)
The definition of a perfect syllogism, therefore, is:
“…discourse in which certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so. … they produce the consequence and … no further term is required from without in order to make the consequence necessary.” (An. Priora pg 66 17-22)
While a syllogism which is imperfect will need,
“… either one or more propositions which are necessary consequences of the terms, but have not been expressly stated as premises.” (An. Priora pg 66 24-26)
In a perfect syllogism the premise is resolved or can be converted in either direction when taken from the middle term. For,
“Every premise states that something either is or must be or may be the attribute of something else. Premises are of three kinds, some are affirmative, others are negative .. in respect of attribution, and others are indefinite. It is necessary then that in universal attribution the terms of the negative attribution should be convertible.” (An. Priora pg 66 32-36)
In addition, a syllogism cannot be formed,
“… When neither the first term belongs to any of the middle; nor the middle to any of the last.” (An. Priora pg 68 bk1 ch3 10)
For if,
“.. the first term belongs to all of the middle, but the middle to none of the last term, there will be no syllogism.” (An. Priora pg 68 bk1 ch4 1-3)
For syllogism is formed when,
” ….. three terms are so related to one another that the last is contained in the middle as in a whole; and the middle is either contained in or excluded from. The first, as in a whole, the extremes must be related by a perfect syllogism. I call that term, middle, which is itself contained in another; and that in which another is contained.” (An. Priora pg 68 bk1 ch31-35)
This Aristotle states, is how syllogism is produced; and having made those distinctions also adds,
” … Syllogism should be discussed before demonstration, because syllogism is more general: the demonstration is a sort of syllogism, but not every syllogism is a demonstration.” (An. Priora pg 68 bk1 ch3 10)
It would seem, to me, that Aristotle was, perhaps, the first to identify and explain the role of variables, such as chance, luck, chaos or spontaneity. That is, we do not simply know or not know about something or nothing but rather, we know of things as a result of other things; the amount or degree may vary or contain or consist of attributes which themselves may vary from object to object or subject to subject. Knowledge, then, appears to be of an infinite nature. For, says Aristotle,
“The universal affirmative is proved by means of the first (term or premise) and only by this; the negative is proved both through the first only and by this in one step, the universal negative is proved through the first and the second (terms or premises); The particular affirmative is proved through the first and last (term or premise) in either one or three steps. The particular negative is proved in all three (terms or premises). It is clear then that the universal affirmative is most difficultto establishl and most easy to overthrow. (An. Priora pg 84 bk1 ch25 32-43)
With such principles in mind it then becomes a question of application, the demonstrative aspects of thinking things through, in a structured, logical and syllogistic manner. One in which all statements made must conform to a minimal of three constraints – all statements must be of three things:
A) A premise or sentence, which affirms or denies one thing or another.
B) All premises within statements must be made in reference to universal or particular, not indifinite, things.
C) Indefinite things can only be that which do not yet exist or belong to something other thanitself; and so, as a
universal principle, particular and general things affirm or deny that things do exist in some demonstrative form.
Which, in a sense says that we cannot say anything about nothing if it, the indefinite, does not exist to define the context, the principle to which the general or particular, which must exist as a demonstrable form to which a definite particular or general, must conform to, to be true.
So, as a rule,
“… First, we must lay down the subject and the definitions and the properties of the thing; next we must lay down the those attributes which follow the thing; and again those which the thing follows and which which cannot belong to it. …. Of attributes which follow, we must distinguish those which fall within the definition, those which are predicated as properties and those which are predicates as accidents; and of the latter, … those which really belong.” (An. Priora pg 85 bk1 ch27 43b 2-10)
Therefore, the princple rule which informs of syllogism is that it:
” …. proceeds through universal premises. If the statement is indefinite, it’s uncertain if the premise is universal. But if the statement is definite, the matter is clear …. for the conclusion of each syllogism resembles its principles”. (An. Priora pg 86 bk1 ch27 14-17)
In general, universals are easier game for the destroyer (universal negatives) than for particulars: for whether the predicate belongs to none or not to some, they are destroyed; and the particular negative is proved.
… particular statements can be refuted in only one way only – by proving that the predicate belongs either to all or none.” (An. Priora pg 84 bk1 ch25 32-43)
The Categories proposes a scheme for the description of particular things in terms of their properties, states, and activities. Prior and Posterior Analytics examine the nature of deductive inference, outlining the system of syllogistic reasoning – propositions which later came to be known as categorical logic. The Metaphysics constitutes a method for universally distinguishing among the four causes and can be used to explain everything; such as, why things are the way they are, what’s the role of chance in the world.
Aristotle defends and outlines his conception of reality, including the eternal existence of substance as well. In On The Soul the notion of composites forms is used to provide a detailed account of the functions exhibited by living things – vegetable, animal, and human – and explain the purpose and uses to which things such as sensation and reason can be utilised to achieve genuine knowledge. That he was interested in a more strict scientific examination of Man’s nature is evident in his discussions of art (Poetics ) and the methods of persuasion(Rhetoric).
In fact, it appears that for Aristotle a disciplined, structured and demonstrative study is necessary to discovering and understanding the nature of ultimate truths, the abstractness of which is contained in the metaphysical aspects of human intellect. It requires of us that we think about the processes and means which we employ in search of all things scientific. It seems that, for Aristotle, the structure of language and logic – intellectual aspects, reveal an understanding of how knowledge is acquired, mirroring in ways the forms through which nature manifests itself all around. If man did not exist, and so – neither did his intellect and his awareness of self, would nature in all its manifestations, excepting Man, exist? Thus, careful application and analysis of linguistic structures serve as a guide to comprehending ultimate or metphysical nature of what is or what is not ‘real’. What Being is or is not.
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