What is the relationship between virtue, knowledge and the immortality of the soul. To provide an answer to such it is, perhaps, best to begin by quoting Meno where he was asked by Socrates, “What do you and your friends say virtue is?” To which Meno replies by saying: “Socrates, even before I met you they told me that in plain truth you are a perplexed man yourself and reduce others to perplexity”. He then goes on to compare Socrates to a sting ray which induces numbness and helplessness with its sting.
But, continues Meno, if Socrates really does not know what virtue is, how will they determine what virtue is, even if they should stumble upon it? How, Meno asks,
“..will you look for something when you don’t in the least know what it is? How are you going to set up something you don’t know about as the object of your search. To put it another way, even if you come right up against it, how will you know that what you have found is the thing that you didn’t know?” (Meno pg 363 d)
This Socrates calls a trick argument. Ignoring for a moment that even if neither could say what virtue is, as a starting point into the discovering of what virtue is, they both already knew or have acknowledged that such a thing as virtue must exist since there are particular things called virtues or said to be virtuous. To know of these things, in essence, is to know what of where virtue is to be found. So, in the absence of knowing what virtue is, it is possible to discover what virtue is by deducing from what is known about virtues and virtuous things.
A method such as this involves the deduction of what is known, in particular cases, of virtuous things or instances; and so, adduce what makes them virtuous, by what means they acquire virtue or at what stage they become virtuous. What virtue is can be deduced by addition or subtraction of discernible attributes which belong or do not belong to things in both particular, and general, not all or some instances. And that which cannot be separated or combined, added or subtracted, multiplied or divided, and so on could, by being indivisible or whole, can be said to be a necessary or essential attribute in all or not in some instances.
This, however, applies mostly to physical things; so then it must be their attributes which change. There is, in effect, a constant which remains during all changes. Animated things, such as humans, undergo varied and constant change but only attributes alter while the general form remain the same. And so, in this sense, it’s safe to say that both Socrates and Meno know and understand that the virtue has has more to do with humans, their actions and how their social affairs are carried out when dealing with one another. Thus, to be a thief, while it may be virtuous to some in particular instances, in general it is not perceived as being as such or a necessary thing that is desired by most. For the thief, and his like, thievery is not a virtue or virtuous; rather, it is a knack and a disreputable one at best.
To show that what he means Socrates refers to what is know about the soul, something which cannot be shown to exist in a physical sense; but which men agree exist in a spiritual or intellectual sense. The poets and priests, he says,
” … say that the soul is immortal. At one time it comes to an end, that which is called death; and at another is born again, but is never fully exterminated. On these grounds a man must live all his days as righteously as possible. …. Thus the soul, since it is immortal and has been born many times and has seen all things … has the knowledge of virtue or anything else which it once possessed. All nature is akin, and the soul has learned everything, so that when a man has recalled a single peice of knowledge – learned it – there is no reason why he should not find out all the rest … for seeking and learning are in fact nothing but recollection.” (Meno pg 364 c-d)
The implications being quite clear, if we agree that the soul, the essence of man, is immortal then man, not in the physical sense or form but that which is Man, is himself immortal and can be shown to be shown by recolling what he knows of things which are not of a physical nature, such as virtue. The question then becomes, what is knowledge? Is it that which we seek, recollect and, in so doing, learn about both physical and non-physical things?
Meno asks,
“… but what do you mean when you say that we don’t learn anything …. that what we call learning is recollection?” (Meno pg 364 e)
Socrates then goes on to show by means of a mathematical demonstration that learning is a recollection. Using a slave boy to demonstrate that what is deduced derives from what is first known. That is, a square has four sides which are equal in length, thus the form of a square must conform to having four sides of equal length; and if each side is of a set length, 2 feet, then the area of the square will be of 4 feet; and a doubling of it would then make it 8 feet, and so forth. But Socrates does not believe that he knows, per se, but is learning; and in this fashion he goes on to demonstrate that what the slave demonstrated that knew as well as what he did not previously know can be attributed to reasoning from what is known to what was previously unknown.
“So, a man who does not know has in himself true opinions on a subject without having knowledge of them. .. And the spontaneous recovery of knowledge that is in him is recollection, isn’t it? Either then he has at some point acquired the knowledge which he now has or he has always possessed it; if on teh other hand he acquired it at some previous time, it cannot have been in this life, unless someone taught him …. (Meno pg 371 86b)
If then there are going to exist in him, both while he is and is not a man, true opinions which can be aroused by questioning and turned into knowledge, may we say that his soul has been forever in a state of knowledge? Clearly he always is or is not a man. … and if the truth about reality is always in our soul the soul must be immortal” (Meno pg 371 86b)
So, Socrates, rather than argue from the position that there is no point in searching for that which we do not know – it’s agreed that we don’t yet know what it is we will be in search of, but virtue would be or one of its essence. Thus, seems a productive and worthy exercise to instead learn of what we do know or can recall; and, in the process of doing so, learn and become more knowledgeable rather than continue on in ignorance. To know and to have knowledge is good, a thing to be striven for instead of its contrary; a possible result of ignorance or improper teaching.
” … we shall be better, braver and more active men if we believe it right to look for what we do not know than if we believe there is no point in looking because what we don’t know know we can never discover.” (Meno pg 371 86c)
And as such, the question of what virtue is or is not then becomes framed as, “..are we to pursue virtue as something that can be taught, or do men have it as a gift of nature or how?” (Meno pg 371 86d), from Meno’s perspective.
To which Socrates responds: ” … we should not have enquired whether or not virtue can be taught until we first asked … what it is. … it seems that we we must enquire into a single property of something about whose essential nature we are still in the dark.” (Meno pg 371 86e)
At this point in the dialogue Meno and Socrates are both in agreement as to how things are learnt, become known or recollected and how knowledge, in a particular sense, comes about: through learning or teaching, recollection or having some previous sense of that knowledge and what knowledge, in general, is; and it seems that knowledge resides within the soul which is or must be immortal for recollection to be possible. And, because neither is clear on what Virtue is, it must then be stated as to what virtue is or is not as well. If it cannot be taught, then there is no such thing as virtue; if there is, then can virtue be taught, and how so? And, without being able to first state what virtue is or is not, Socrates begins his investigation with a hypothesis:
” ….. let us use a hypothesis in investigating whether it is teachable or not. .. What attribute of the soul must virtue be, if it’s to be teachable or otherwise? …. If it’s anything else but knowledge, is there a possibility of anyone teaching it … will it be teachable? Isn’t it plain to everyone that a man is not taught anything except knowledge?” (Meno pg 372 87c)
So, virtue must be teachable or not; If it can be taught then it can be demonstrated, demonstration being a part of teaching; as as such is knowable or a part of knowledge. If it cannot be taught, then it will have to be shown that it is unteachable nor can be recollected – the soul, thus, having no recollection of what virtue is. It must be an attribute of the soul which is eternal and the source of Knowledge; if so, virtue will be of the soul and eternal. The problem, we know there is such a thing as Virtue but are unable to say what it is. But it doesn’t matter what it end up being called – virtue or knowledge.
Socrates then states,
“The next point then …. is to find out whether virtue is knowledge or something different. Then do we asser that virtue is something good?” (Meno pg 372 c)
For, if it is something that is good then,
” … if there exists any good thing different from and not associated with knowledge, virtue will not necessarily be any for of knowledge. If, on the other hand, knowledge embraces everthing that is good, we shall be right to suspect that virtue is knowledge.” (Meno pg 372 d)
We now, at least, have an idea how go about finding and recognising essential attributes which must exist, together and in some form, to become virtue or be virtuous. So, it is virtue that makes us good. Further, Socrates asks,
“And if good, the advantageous. All good things being advantageous, are they not? … So, virtue itself must be something advantageous. ….What is the controlling factor which determines whether something is advantageous or harmful? Isn’t it right use which makes them advantageous, and lack of it harmful? (Meno pg 372,87 e, pg 373 88, a)
Socrates goes even further by including another quality or attribute that virtue must have or exhibit – a spiritual. In this way, he precludes that virtue can ever be ascribed or be a physical property or attribute. This being necessary since, if virtue is good, and goodness emanates from the soul, which is good and eternal – all attributes which are not of a physical nature, then must be of a spiritual nature. And as such, virtue, by necessity, must be of a spiritual nature. Take for instance,
“… any such qualities which in your view are not knowledge but something different, Don’t you think that they may be harmful as well as advantageous? Courage, for instance, if it’s thoughtless, just a sort of confidence. Isn’t it true that to be confident without reason does a man harm, whereas a reasoned confidence profits him?” (Meno pg 373 88, b)
Therefore, a necessary and spiritual condition of the soul is to seek that which is good or goodness; and in doing so, learn and acquire knowledge – which is itself good, beneficial or advantageous to the soul. Knowledge, then, comes about through learning and recollection – not teaching, of things that is already of the soul – spiritual things: goodness, happiness, wisdom, harmony, forms, logic, science, dialogue, exchange of ideas, demonstrations, and opinions, and so forth as always good. In addition, the soul never willingly embraces what is disadvantageous to itself; as well, the soul is given the ability to reason and choose the good over the bad or disadvantageous.
“In short, everthing the human spirit undertakes or suffers will lead to happiness when it is guided by wisdom; to the opposite when guided by folly. (Meno pg 373 88, d)
If then virtue is an attribute of the spirit and one which cannot be fail to be beneficial, it must be wisdom, for all spiritual qualities in and by themselves are neither advantageous or harmful; but become advantageous or harmful by the presence of wisdom and folly. (Meno pg 373 88, c)
So, we may say in general that goodness of non-spiritual assets depends on our spiritual character; and the goodness of that on wisdom. This shows that the advantageous elements must be wisdom, and virtue, is advantageous. So, …. virtue, either in whole or in part is wisdom. If so, men cannot be good by nature. (Meno pg 374 89, a)
And so, since goodness or virtue do not come about by nature, is it got by learning? The assumption is correct if virtue is knowledge and can be taught. Which must be all good before they can be said to be good or of goodness. But, as we see Socrates puzzled about that conclusion as well when he stated:
“Yes, but to be sound it has gotto seem all right not only ‘just now’ but at this moment and in the future.” (Meno pg 374 89, b)
As a teacher and a seeker of knowledge, he appears to have been truly in search of wisdom. If virtue is knowledge and can be taught, then why, he puzzled – are there no teachers of virtue? There are those who teach other arts in which knowledge is transfered or passed on. But what is a teacher of virtue to be called? He says,
“… I wonder if we were right to bind ourselves to that (that virtue can be taught or is teachable). (Meno pg 374 89, d)
“If anything – not only virtue – is a possible subject of instruction, must there not be teachers and students of it? … and conversely, if there are neither teacher or students of a subject, we may safely infer that it cannot be taught.” (Meno pg 374 89, d)
However, I think Socrates was being somewhat sly here when he was asked by Meno:
“… don’t you think there are teachers of virtue?” (Meno pg 374 89, e)
To which Socrates responds,
“All I can say is that I have oftened looked to see if there are any, and, in spite of all my efforts I cannot find them, though I have had plenty of fellow searchers, the kind of men especially who I believe have the most experience in such matters.” (Meno pg 374 90)
I’d say that in today’s world of double-speak, that Socrates in that comment manages to compliment Meno for been a fine student and teacher – in his continuing search for not only virtue but knowledge and wisdom, all things spiritual in nature. He skillfully avoided answering the question …. now that they have both agreed on what Virtue and so many other things connected and related to knowledge, teaching, learning, demonstrative things are about in general and in particular – of which of the two, Meno or Socrates, turned out to have been the teacher and the student during their discussion, especially about the nature of virtue. In my opinion, Socrates was able to teach and so convince Meno that he Socrates knew more about Virtue, as so wiser of the two.
A neat little trick Socrates seems perform with dialectical deftness coupled with his professed ignorance. A man wiser than he lets on, in fact. Something which Alcibiades hints at in the Symposium when he states:
” … .. If you open up his arguments and really get into the skin of them, you will find that they’re the only arguments in the world that have any sense … nobody else’s are so godlike, so rich in images of virtue … so pertinent to those enquiries that help the seeker on his way to the goal of true nobility.” (Symposium pg 572 221 c-e)
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